

## Joint Interpretation Library

# JIL Tachograph MS PP Clarification

Version 1.0 July 2022

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#### 1 Introduction

- 1 This document provides a clarification of the
- "Common Criteria Protection Profile Digital Tachograph Motion Sensor (MS PP), Version 1.0, 9 May 2017, Compliant with Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 of 18 March 2016 implementing Regulation (EU) 165/2014 (Annex 1C) certified under certification ID BSI-CC-PP-0093-2017"
- The MS PP is intended to specify the Common Criteria IT-security requirements for a motion sensor of a digital tachograph system in order to cover the IT-security requirements of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 of 18 March 2016 implementing Regulation (EU) 165/2014 (Annex 1C).

#### 2 Objectives

The objective of this clarification is to ensure a harmonised application of the MS PP in order to to fulfill the IT-security requirements of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 of 18 March 2016 implementing Regulation (EU) 165/2014 (Annex 1C).

#### 3 Clarification

- 5 The MS PP includes amongst others the following non-hierarchical SFRs:
  - FPT\_PHP.2 Notification of physical attack (with application note 8)
  - FPT\_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack (iteration 1 and 2)
- 6 FPT\_PHP.2 requires opening detection with (active) notification as well as passive detection.
- 7 Application note 8 is related to FPT\_PHP.2 and clarifies that opening detection with (active) notification is only required in the case that the TOE can be opened.
- 8 FPT\_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack (iteration 1 and 2) has to be fulfilled by the TOE in any case.

9 This means:

- In any case the TOE shall resist physical tampering attacks to the TSF software and TSF data and shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might compromise the TSF.
- In the case that the TOE is equipped with an opening mechanisms (e.g. a screw top), the TOE shall in addition
  - provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred and
  - monitor the devices and elements and notify [a paired VU] when physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.

### 4 References

- [1] Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 of 18 March 2016 implementing Regulation (EU) 165/2014 (Annex 1C).
- [2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional components, April 2017, Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
- [3] Common Criteria Protection Profile Digital Tachograph Motion Sensor (MS PP), Version 1.0, 9 May 2017, Compliant with Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 of 18 March 2016 implementing Regulation (EU) 165/2014 (Annex 1C) – certified under certification ID BSI-CC-PP-0093-2017"